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Abstract
Leniency policies and rewards for whistleblowers are being introduced in ever more ￿elds of law
enforcement, though their deterrence e⁄ects are often hard to observe, and the likely e⁄ect of changes
in the speci￿c features of these schemes can only be observed experimentally. This paper reports results
from an experiment designed to examine the e⁄ects of ￿nes, leniency programs, and reward schemes
for whistleblowers on ￿rms￿decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and on their price choices. Our
subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game with di⁄erentiated goods and uncertain duration, and we
run several treatments di⁄erent in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of ￿ne, the possibility
of self-reporting (and not paying a ￿ne), the existence of a reward for reporting. We ￿nd that ￿nes
following successful investigations but without leniency have a deterrence e⁄ect (reduce the number of
cartels formed) but also a pro-collusive e⁄ect (increase collusive prices in surviving cartels). Leniency
programs might not be more e¢ cient than standard antitrust enforcement, since in our experiment they
do deter a signi￿cantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but they also induce even higher prices in
those cartels that are not reported, pushing average market price signi￿cantly up relative to treatments
without antitrust enforcement. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically
reported, which completely disrupts subjects￿ability to form cartels and sustain high prices, and almost
complete deterrence is achieved. If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program the deterrence
e⁄ect of leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise. As for tacit collusion, under standard anti-
trust enforcement or leniency programs subjects who do not communicate (do not go for explicit cartels)
tend to choose weakly higher prices than where there is no anti-trust enforcement. We also analyze
post-conviction behavior, ￿nding that there is a strong expost deterrence (desistance) e⁄ect. Moreover
post-conviction prices are on average lower than before even though the average prices within cartels
are the same. Finally, we ￿nd a strong cultural e⁄ect comparing treatments in Stockholm with those in
Rome, suggesting that optimal law enforcement institutions di⁄er with culture.
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11 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed major innovations in the law enforcement against price cartels. Following the
US example, leniency programs that reduce sanctions for cartel members that self-report to the competition
authority have been introduced in most OECD countries and have become the main tool for cartel discov-
ery and prosecution.1 The European Competition Network, a forum including all European competition
authorities also launched a "model" for the design of e⁄ective leniency programs.2 In some jurisdictions
(e.g. Korea) reward schemes for whistle-blowers that report a cartel have also been adopted, following their
successful use in the ￿ght of government fraud (US False Claim Act) and tax evasion.3
The introduction of leniency programs increased dramatically the number of cartels detected and con-
victed in the US and the EU, and this is why they are considered a tremendous success (see Spagnolo 2006
for details). A higher number of detected and prosecuted cases, however, is not always a good indicator
of the e⁄ectiveness of Anti-trust policies.4 For example, an extremely lenient policy that reduces ￿nes to
almost all parties of a discovered cartels in exchange for information will enormously facilitate prosecution
and generate many spontaneous reports. Such a policy could well make a competition authority famous
as a successful agency, but is likely to heavily damage society by at the same time (a) encouraging cartel
formation through the drastic reduction in expected ￿nes that such a overly lenient policy generates, and
(b) increasing the cost of prosecution (by the higher number of prosecuted cartels, given that prosecution
costs are a pure deadweight losses for society). Law enforcement￿ s main objective is crime deterrence, i.e.
prevention. An e¢ cient and successful antitrust policy against cartels should have tough ex ante deterrence
e⁄ects that keep low both the costs of prosecution and those of price ￿xing activities.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the deterrence e⁄ects of antitrust ￿nes, leniency programs,
and reward schemes for whistle-blowers. In particular we focus on how monetary ￿nes, leniency programs,
and reward schemes against price ￿xing cartels a⁄ect market participants￿decision to form cartels (cartel
deterrence) and their price choices. We also analyze how di⁄erent design of antitrust policy may a⁄ect ￿rms￿
ability to enter in tacit collusive agreements instead, since as Whinston (2006) recently reminded us, the
￿nal objective of competition policy is to keep prices at competitive level, not to deter explicit horizontal
agreements per se. The main questions raised in this paper are, therefore, the following:
1. What are the e⁄ects of traditional antitrust law enforcement, ￿nes following successful investigations
of the competition authority but no leniency, on cartel formation and on pricing behavior in and outside the
formed cartels?
2. What are the e⁄ects of introducing a leniency program when reporting the cartel? Does it make a
di⁄erence if the report is secret or not? Do things improve when expected ￿nes are higher, or when the
ringleader is banned from leniency as in the US (but not in the EU)? Is the possibility to report used as
improved opportunity to undercut the cartel, or as a threat to punish defectors and thereby stabilize cartels,
or both?
3. What are the e⁄ects of rewarding the ￿rst party that applies for leniency with a bonus equal to the
￿nes paid by the co-conspirators in that cartel? Also, do agents exploit the reward scheme taking turn in
reporting and cashing the reward when the scheme is too generous and makes this a pro￿table option?
4. What are the e⁄ects of these di⁄erent law enforcement instruments on agents￿choice of collusive price
and on their ability to sustain tacit collusion, given the importance of this issue in the recent debate?
The big problem with optimizing law enforcement policy by looking at its real world performance is
that for cartels and analogous forms of organized crime (fraud, corruption, earning management, etc.) there
1The Antitrust Division of the US DoJ has had a leniency programs for cartels since the seventies but reformed the program
in 1993 and 1994, introducing the novel Corporate and Individual Leniency Policy, and later on introduced the Amnesty Plus
scheme. Analogously, the EC￿ s DG Comp introduced a ￿rst Leniency Notice in 1996, and revised it in 2002.
2The ECN leniency "model" is substantially more lenient than the US program, as it allows to partially reduce ￿nes
practically to all members of a cartel, while the US leniency program is restricted to the ￿rst party that reports only.
3In December 2006 The US Congress strengthened the legislation that already allowed whistleblowers to cash as rewards 15
to 30% of taxes and ￿nes recovered by the IRS thanks to their help, by making the payment of the reward almost automatic. A
change that, by reducing the agency discretion on the payment of the reward, resembles the 1993 change in the US Corporate
Leniency Program.
4This was often mentioned in the lively debate on the e⁄ectiveness of antitrust enforcement (see e.g. Crandall and Winston
2003, Baker 2003, Kwoka 2003, and Werden 2003, among others).
2is precious little else to look at than discovered and prosecuted cases. Contrary to most other types of
crimes, where there are conscious victims that denounce and thereby signal the frequency of the crime
independently from the fraction of these crimes where the criminal is detected and convicted, victims of
cartels and analogous forms of organized crime (corruption, fraud, etc.) are mostly not aware of them. This
implies that we cannot directly observe the total population of cartels in society and how this changes with
the introduction of new policies, though indirect methods o⁄er partial indications (see e.g. Harrington, 2006;
Miller, 2007).5 This intrinsic lack of observability, accompanied by the fact that many design features of the
proposed and theoretically analyzed schemes have never been implemented in reality, makes experimental
investigation a crucial policy tool, an almost unique possibility to try measure the likely change in deterrence,
prices and welfare caused by the many di⁄erent possible designs of law enforcement policies.
We consider an experimental framework, as close as possible to the strategic situation agents face in an
oligopolistic industry subject to current antitrust laws, in which subjects play a repeated Bertrand price
game with di⁄erentiated goods. Subjects can decide to coordinate on price (and thus they form a cartel).
We consider several treatments di⁄erent in the probability of cartels being caught, the level of ￿ne, the
possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a ￿ne), the existence of a reward for reporting. We are not the
￿rst to look at these issues experimentally. Apesteguja, Dufwemberg and Selten (2007) and Hinloopen and
Soetevent (2006), for example, have already produced instructive pieces of work in this direction. However,
as will be explained in depth in the next section discussing the literature, we found that both those previous
experiments could be further improved in one way or another, and that they do not cover most of the
important policy issues we wanted to deal with in our experiment. In particular we ￿nd new results on
secret reports, reward schemes, the interaction between ￿nes, leniency and deterrence and tacit collusion.
We found that traditional antitrust law enforcement, ￿nes following successful investigations of the com-
petition authority and no leniency, has a deterrence e⁄ect (reduces the number of cartels formed) but also
has a pro-collusive e⁄ect (increases collusive prices). Leniency programs might not be more e¢ cient than
standard antitrust enforcement, since they do deter a signi￿cantly higher fraction of cartels from forming,
but they also induce higher prices in cartels that are not reported. If the ringleader is excluded from the
leniency program, as under the US leniency policy, the deterrence e⁄ect of leniency falls and prices are higher
than otherwise. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically reported, disrupting
completely subjects￿ability to form cartels and to sustain high prices. Also, we ￿nd that when the reward
scheme is ￿ wrongly designed￿in the sense that can be exploited, in our case by completely eliminating the risk
of being ￿ned at no cost, subjects do not recognize the possibility to manipulate and gain from the scheme, a
result in line with recent experiments in other ￿elds (see e.g. Dal Bo, 2005). We also analyze post-conviction
behavior, ￿nding that there is a strong ex post deterrence (desistance) e⁄ect. Moreover post-conviction
prices are on average lower than before even though the average prices within cartels are the same. If the
ringleader is excluded from the leniency program, as under the US leniency policy, the deterrence e⁄ect of
leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise. As a ￿rst step for analyzing tacit collusion, we focus
on subjects￿ s behavior when they do not communicate (do not go for explicit cartels). We ￿nd that under
standard antitrust enforcement or leniency programs, subjects who do not communicate choose signi￿cantly
higher prices than where there is no anti-trust enforcement whatsoever. This is not the case anymore when
reward schemes are introduced. Finally, we ￿nd a strong cultural e⁄ect comparing treatments in Stockholm
with those in Rome, suggesting that optimal law enforcement institutions di⁄er with culture.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature, theor-
etical and experimental. Section 3 describes the underlying theoretical model and the experimental design,
contrasting it with previous ones. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes, discussing implications
for the theory and practice of designing deterrence mechanisms for cartels and similar forms of organized
crime. An appendix contains the instructions for the experiment.
5Harrington (2006) develops a smart indirect method to estimate the likely changes in deterrence caused by the introduction
of a new law enforcement instrument based on the observed changes in duration of the detected cartels. Miller (2007) further
develops the approach and applies it to cartels detected in the US in the last decades, ￿nding positive deterrence e⁄ects of
cartel formation consistent with those we observe in our experiment. Unfortunately this work appears not to o⁄er results or
implication regarding price and welfare changes, which as our results show may not go in the expected direction (Sprouls 1993




Starting with the contributions of Motta and Polo (2003), Rey (2003), and Spagnolo (2000a,b), a theoretical
literature has blossomed in the last decade that analyzes the optimal design of anti-cartel policies based on
the provision of incentives to breach trust and to self-report.6 Di⁄erent e⁄ects of leniency and rewards are
considered in this literature. The focus here is on the deterrence e⁄ects of the ￿rst part of the leniency
policies, restricted to ￿rms that self-report before an investigation by the competition authority has invested
them. The most important e⁄ects identi￿ed by the literature in this respect are:
1. The protection from ￿nes e⁄ect. Spagnolo (2000a, 2004) and Rey (2003) suggest that amnesty o⁄ered
to the ￿rst ￿rm reporting before an investigation is open may have deterrence e⁄ects by ensuring that
if a cartel member wants to undercut the cartel, it can report and avoid paying the ￿ne.7
2. The reward e⁄ect. Spagnolo (2000a, 2004), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001, 2006), Rey (2003) and
Aubert et al. (2006) suggest that rewards could further increase deterrence by generating stronger
temptations to undercut the cartel and cash the reward by reporting. Spagnolo (2000a, 2004) shows
that such a mechanism can for the ￿rst time deliver the ￿rst best in a model a la Becker (1968),
complete deterrence without investigation costs, provided that ￿nes are su¢ ciently but ￿nitely large,
and that the reward is lower than total ￿nes.
3. The ￿ reporting as a threat￿and ￿ what does not kills us makes us stronger￿e⁄ects. Spagnolo (2000b)
and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001, 2006) show that when self-reporting becomes attractive thanks to
leniency programs, the threat of self-reporting to punish an agent that did not behave as the cartel
agreed upon may also become credible, and may be exploited to enforce cartels that would not be
sustainable otherwise. Building on this idea, Ellis and Wilson (2001) obtain a related e⁄ect, showing
that, for cartels that are not deterred, leniency programs have the e⁄ect of reinforce/stabilize collusion.
The reason is that if a cartel is formed, then leniency induces cartel members to self-report after any
defection from agreed collusive strategies, thereby strengthening the punishment for defections of an
amount equal to antitrust ￿nes.
4. Tacit collusion and post-conviction pricing. Antitrust doctrine agreed in the 50s that the focus should
be restricted to ￿ explicit cartels￿ , i.e. to conspiracies where ￿rm managers meet or communicate with
the explicit objective of coordinating on higher prices, and leave alone tacit collusion, i.e. cases where
￿rms manage to coordinate on and sustain high prices without explicit communication. Whinston
(2006) reopened the debate, arguing that what is important for welfare are prices, so that we should
re￿ ect more on how antitrust enforcement may a⁄ect ￿rms￿ability to sustain prices, even when high
prices are sustained by tacit collusion. On a di⁄erent but related stance, Buccirossi and Spagnolo
(2007) suggest that antitrust ￿nes might have the e⁄ect of inducing ￿rms to increase collusive prices
following conviction, either because they do not realize they are a ￿ sunk cost￿and try to recover them
through higher margins, or because paid ￿nes may help ￿rms coordinating on higher post-conviction
prices sustained by tacit collusion.
We discuss such e⁄ects when we present the experimental results.
2.2 Experiments
Apesteguja, Dufwemberg and Selten (2007), and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) are the ￿rst to analyze
experimentally the e⁄ects of leniency policies on cartel deterrence.8
6Other early pieces include Aubert et al. (2006), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001, 2006), Ellis and Wilson (2001), Harrington
(2006) and Harrington and Chen (2007). See Spagnolo (2006) for a review of this growing theoretical literature.
7More recently Harrington (forthcoming) coined a perhaps nicer acronym for the same e⁄ect, deviator amnesty e⁄ect, but
here we stick to temporal priority.
8We are aware of two other studies that deal with not exactly the same issues but are somewhat related. Hamaguchi and
Kawagoe (2005) design an experiment where subjects are forced to collude. Most obviously, such a setup cannot address the
42.2.1 Apesteguja, Dufwemberg and Selten (2007)
Apesteguja et al. (2007) conducted the ￿rst experimental investigation of the e⁄ects of Leniency policies
and rewards schemes on cartel deterrence. This elegant paper ￿rst develops a stylized but static theoretical
framework that tries to capture the main points made in the theoretical literature mentioned earlier on the
general deterrence e⁄ects of leniency policies, and then uses it to undertake an experimental analysis of
these e⁄ects. The market game they focus on is a one-shot homogeneous discrete Bertrand oligopoly. This
is embedded in four alternative legal frameworks: in Ideal there is no antitrust law, cartels are not possible
(communication is not allowed), and colluding ￿rms face neither full nor reduced ￿nes; in Standard convicted
￿rms face ￿nes equal to 10% of their revenue and no reduction if they report; in Leniency ￿rms that report
a cartel they took part in receive a reduction in their ￿ne; in Bonus reporting ￿rms receive part of the ￿nes
paid by other ￿rms as a reward. Strategically equivalent collusive subgame perfect equilibria, including one
implementing the monopoly price, exist in both Standard and Leniency, sustained by the threat of reporting
if a defection takes place. The reason is that if a ￿rm defects in an homogeneous Bertrand game, its opponent
will have no revenue, so even if there is no leniency self-reporting is costless for a party whose opponent
defected and is therefore a credible threat that can sustain collusion in the one-shot game.
The experimental settings allows for pre-play communication and let subjects play in groups of three,
and for the rest it follows closely the theoretical model just described.
The experimental results con￿rm that agents understand and use the threat of reporting to sustain
collusion in the one-shot Bertrand game: prices are substantially higher in Standard and in Leniency, where
collusive equilibria exist sustained by the threat to self-report if cheated upon, than in Ideal where no such
threat is available and the only equilibrium is the Bertrand one. Leniency has a signi￿cant deterrence e⁄ect
relative to Standard, although prices are much higher than in Ideal, without any antitrust. Surprisingly, the
experimental results are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions that rewarding reporting ￿rms should
reduce cartel formation: the Bonus treatment has non-signi￿cant e⁄ects on collusion.
As also argued by the authors, this paper can be seen as a ￿rst exploratory step in the experimental
analysis of cartel deterrence mechanism. The reason is that both theory and experiment make a number of
simpli￿cations that may a⁄ect the result in a non trivial way.
First, the game and experiment allow for only one round of decisions, leaving experimental subjects no
way to learn. This may be a problem for the interpretation of the experimental results. The equilibria
agents are choosing among in Standard and Leniency, and the di⁄erence with Bonus are not that easy to
understand. Most recent experimental studies of one-shot games allow for some repetition precisely because
it is well known from earlier work on public goods games that the ￿rst decisions are typically mistaken. In
fact, it is possible that the surprising result on the ine⁄ectiveness of Bonus is driven by subjects not fully
grasping the situation.
In our experiment we try to improve on this point by having both a repeated game, and ￿ve initial rounds
for subjects to experiment the game.
Second, the theoretical framework used for the experiment resembles closely that in Spagnolo (2000b),
but for ￿nes chosen equal 10% of ￿rms￿revenue. In this case, even without leniency programs in place
(like in the Standard treatment), reporting becomes a credible threat. If a partner-cartelist undercuts then
reporting is costless since the revenue on the punishment path is zero. In reality there is 10% revenue cap
for EU ￿nes but it is relative to ￿rms￿total yearly turnover in the last period the cartel is active. In an
appropriately dynamic framework, therefore, ￿nes would never be zero because of a defection. Moreover,
it is hard to imagine a market where, if a ￿rm undercuts the cartel, other ￿rms have zero revenue for one
full year. Firms are active in many markets and total business stealing appears impossible in reality, so
that absent leniency policies, a ￿rm that reports a cartel would always be subject to a positive ￿ne. Given
that reporting is costly, the multiplicity of equilibria in Standard disappear as after a defection reporting
is dominated by not doing it (and avoiding the ￿ne), and Leniency may then fare much worse than how
depicted. Moreover, homogeneous good Bertrand competition is a degenerate case of price competition
issue of how di⁄erent policies perform in terms of cartel deterrence. Hamaguchi et al. (2007) adapt the setup of Hinloopen and
Soetevent but to a repeated procurement auction with leniency programs. They consider a di⁄erent game since there is only
one winner at each period, so when players are colluding, they have to decide who will win the auction. They found evidence
of deterrence e⁄ects with Leniency programs as well as higher prices under leniency and antitrust than under communication.
5with di⁄erentiated products, and the collusive equilibria in Standard would disappear with a little product
di⁄erentiation.
To improve on these points, in our experiment we chose an in￿nitely repeated di⁄erentiated product
Bertrand game, and ￿xed ￿nes rather than ￿nes that go to zero for some price choices.
2.2.2 Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006)
Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) study experimentally general deterrence e⁄ect but also desistance e⁄ect of
Leniency Programs. They use an in￿nite horizon set up that allows for communication before prices are
chosen each period, and where the stage game is the same homogeneous Bertrand game used by Apesteguja
et al. (2007). Subjects are matched in groups of three at the beginning of each treatment, and then play
without re-matchings for at least 20 rounds, after which the continuation probability falls to 80%.
They embedded these oligopoly games in four di⁄erent treatments: Benchmark, where subjects cannot
communicate; Communication, where subjects can communicate before choosing prices; Antitrust, where
subjects that communicated are exposed to a positive probability of being detected and ￿ned; and Leniency,
which di⁄ers from Antitrust by the possibility to self-report after the choice of price and before the random
audit by the competition authority. In Leniency, therefore, subjects can only self-report after prices have
been chosen and made public, so that subjects cannot both secretly report and secretly undercut the collusive
price, as is possible in reality where competition authorities may keep the report secret to arrange for dawn
raids allowing (or even asking to) the reporting ￿rm the possibility to secretly undercut former cartel partners.
Fines are also equal to 10% of revenue in the period of conviction, but there is a ￿xed cost of reporting under
the leniency program. Such feature destroys Apesteguja et al.￿ s (2007) one-shot collusive equilibria sustained
by the threat of reporting after defections.
These authors￿main ￿ndings are that leniency: (i) increases cartel deterrence (fewer cartels are formed);
(ii) reduces the duration of cartels that are not deterred (agents that form a cartel defect more afterwards);
and (iii) makes agents defect more aggressively than in the absence of the Leniency Program. They do not
￿nd that the leniency program a⁄ects the likelihood that a detected and ￿ned cartel forms again thereafter
(no e⁄ects on recidivism).
Although Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) is the experimental work which is closest to what we do, our
experiments di⁄er from theirs in several respects.
First, in each stage-game subjects can both self-report and set prices before any of these choices is
observed by other subjects. This implies that subjects have the possibility to simultaneously secretly report
and defect/undercut cartel partners, much like in reality, and then they will have also the possibility to
self-report after observing price choices, if nobody reported before price became public. We consider this
a major improvement towards the realism of the experimental set up that allows agents to defect from the
cartel and avoid ￿nes, as possible in reality. This allows us to disentangle and quantify reports linked to
defections (the ￿ protection from ￿nes￿e⁄ect discussed in section 2.1) and reports that are made to punish
defections from the cartel (the ￿ reporting as a threat￿or ￿ what does not kill us makes us stronger￿e⁄ects
discussed in section 2.1). Note also that, as it is the case in reality, in our experimental design reporting to
the Antitrust authority is always possible even if this leads to no reduction in ￿nes.
Second, we have ￿xed ￿nes. The main reason is that when ￿nes are equal to 10% of the revenue of the
period in which cartel is detected, as it is the case for the others two mentioned experimental studies, ￿nes
vary a lot with the outcome of the stage-game in which a cartel happens to be detected, so that it is not
clear what the expected ￿ne perceived by subjects actually is, which makes it impossible to cleanly analyze
the role of ￿nes and their interaction with leniency.
Third we follow Apesteguja et al. (2007) in framing the experiment explicitly as a cartel/antitrust game,
rather than having a "neutral" frame as in Hinloopen and Soetevent, as we want to make sure that subjects
do not misunderstand the situation, and we want to minimize the possible impact of social preferences on
subjects￿choices.
Fourth, we use a perhaps more realistic oligopoly model, a repeated di⁄erentiated product Bertrand
game.
Fifth our subjects are rematched with positive and constant probability all along the treatments, so that
6each supergame has a constant continuation probability, like in Dal B￿ (2005), Dal B￿ and Frechette (2007),
and Blonski et al. (2007).
Sixth, we use duopolies rather than triopolies, to avoid that agents may be unwilling to punish defections
too hard by the unwillingness to harm a third ￿ innocent￿(non-defecting) party, as suggested by Holt (1995).
In addition, and again di⁄erently from Hinlopen and Soetevent, we consider other important e⁄ects, in
particular the e⁄ects of rewards for whistle blowers. We are able, in an appropriately dynamic environment,
to test the robustness of Apesteguja et al.￿ s (2006) surprising mixed ￿nding about reward schemes
3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design is most closely related to the one by Hinloopen and Soetevent, but we introduce
a number of crucial modi￿cations. Our innovations are mainly relative to the timing when subjects can
self-report, the ￿nes￿structure, the oligopoly game, and the framing of the experiment. We also consider
two extra treatments, Reward and LenRing, which will be discussed in detail below when we describe our
experiment.
In our experiment, each subject represented a ￿rm and played in anonymous two-persons groups a
repeated duopoly game. In every stage game, the subjects had to take three types of decisions. First, they
had to choose a price in a discrete Bertrand price game with di⁄erentiated goods. Second, they had to
decide whether or not to form a cartel by discussing prices. Third, the subjects could choose to self report
cartels to a competition authority. The attractiveness of this latter opportunity depended on the details of
the antitrust law enforcement institution - the treatment variables of our experiment.
3.1 The Bertrand game
In each period, the subjects had to choose a price from the choice set f0;1;:::;11;12g. The resulting pro￿ts
depended on their own price choice and on the price chosen by their competitor and were reported in a pro￿t
table distributed to the subjects (see Table 1). This table was derived from the following standard linear
Bertrand game. (The details of the Bertrand game were not described to the subjects.)
your competitor￿ s price
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 29 38 47 56 64 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
2 36 53 71 89 107 124 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
3 20 47 73 100 127 153 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
4 0 18 53 89 124 160 196 224 224 224 224 224 224
5 0 0 11 56 100 144 189 233 260 260 260 260 260
your 6 0 0 0 0 53 107 160 213 267 288 288 288 288
price 7 0 0 0 0 0 47 109 171 233 296 308 308 308
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 107 178 249 320 320 320
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 100 180 260 324 324
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89 178 267 320
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 171 269
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 160
Table 1: Pro￿ts in the Bertrand game






1 ￿ ￿2pi +
￿
1 ￿ ￿2pj
7where pi (pj) is the price chosen by ￿rm i (￿rm j), a is a parameter accounting for the market size and
￿ 2 [0;1) denotes the degree of substitutability between the two ￿rms￿products. Each ￿rm faced a constant
marginal cost, c, and had no ￿xed costs. The pro￿t function, ￿i(pi;pj), was thus given by
￿i(pi;pj) = (pi ￿ c)qi:
In our experimental setup, we chose a = 36, c = 0 and ￿ = 4=5 and restricted the subjects￿choice set
to f0;2;:::;22;24g. These parameters yield the payo⁄ table distributed to each subject. To simplify the
table we also relabeled each price by dividing it by 2 and rounded the payo⁄s to the closest integer. In
the unique Bertrand equilibrium, both ￿rms charge a price equal to 3 yielding per ￿rm pro￿ts of 100. The
monopoly price (charged by both ￿rms) is 9, yielding pro￿ts of 180. Note also that a ￿rm would earn 296
by unilaterally and optimally undercutting the monopoly price, i.e. by charging a price of 7. In this case
the other (cheated upon) ￿rm only earns a pro￿t of 20. Similarly, there are gains from deviating unilaterally
from other common prices than the monopoly price as well as associated losses for the cheated upon ￿rm; in
the range of prices in between the Bertrand price and the monopoly price, i.e. in the range f4;:::;8g, these
gains and losses are smaller than when a subject deviates unilaterally from the monopoly price.
3.2 Cartel formation
Throughout the experiment, the subjects could form cartels by discussing prices. At the beginning of
every period, a communication window opened if and only if both subjects agreed to communicate. This
communication stage, which is described in more detail below, was designed in such a way that it would
result in a common price on which to cooperate. This agreed upon price was non-binding, however, and
therefore each subject could cheat on the agreement by subsequently charging a price di⁄erent from the
agreed upon price.
Whenever two subjects chose to communicate, they were considered to have formed a cartel. In this case,
the subjects risked to be ￿ned as long as the competition authority had not yet detected the cartel. This
implied that two subjects could be ￿ned in a period even if no communication took place in that speci￿c
period; for example, two subjects could be ￿ned in a period in which they did not communicate if they had
communicated in the previous period and the competition authority had not detected the associated cartel
in that period. Once a cartel was detected, however, it was considered to be dismantled and in subsequent
periods, the former cartelists did not run any risk of being ￿ned unless they communicated again.
3.3 Antitrust law enforcement (Treatments)
Whenever two subjects had formed a cartel, a competition authority could detect the cartel and convict
its members for price ￿xing. Detection could happen in two ways. First, in every period, the competition
authority detected cartels with an exogenous probability, ￿. If this happened, both cartel members had to
pay an exogenous ￿ne, F. Second, the cartel members could self-report the cartel, in which case the cartel
members were convicted for price ￿xing with certainty. If this happened, the size of the ￿ne depended on
the details of the law enforcement institution.
We ran ￿ve types of treatments and we adopted a between subjects design, so that every subject only
played the game under a single treatment. Each treatment corresponded to a speci￿c type of antitrust law,
that is our treatment variables were the di⁄erent law enforcement institutions. The di⁄erences between the
treatments are summarized in table 2.
Our baseline treatment corresponds to a laisser faire regime and is denoted Communication: in this
treatment, ￿ = F = 0 so that forming a cartel by discussing prices is legal. To simplify the instructions and
to eliminate irrelevant alternatives, subjects were not allowed to report cartels. In the four other treatments,
denoted Antitrust, Leniency, LenRing and Reward, the expected ￿ne (given that no reports took place)
was strictly positive (￿ = 0:1 and F = 200 yielding an expected ￿ne ￿F = 20) and cartel members were
allowed to report cartels in which they participated. The Antitrust treatment corresponds to traditional
antitrust laws without any leniency program: in case a report took place, both cartel members (including
the reporting one) had to pay the full ￿ne F. The Leniency treatment corresponds to current antitrust
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Treatment ￿ne (F) probability report report￿ s
of detection (￿) e⁄ects
Communication 0 0 No ￿
Antitrust 200 0.10 Yes pay the full ￿ne
Leniency 200 0.10 Yes no ￿ne (half the ￿ne if both report)
LenRing 200 0.10 Yes￿ no ￿ne
Reward 200 0.10 Yes reward (half the ￿ne if both report)
￿Only for the player who￿ s the last to decide to communicate.
laws embedded with a leniency program: in case the cartel was reported by one of the cartel members only,
the reporting member paid no ￿ne while the other one paid the full ￿ne, F; if instead both cartel members
reported the cartel simultaneously, both paid a reduced ￿ne equal to F=2. The treatment LenRing was
identical to Leniency except that the ￿rst subject attempting to communicate was treated as the cartel￿ s
initiator - the so-called ringleader - and, as a result, was not eligible for the leniency program. (The way
the ringleader was identi￿ed is described in more detail below). Finally, the Reward treatment di⁄ered
from Leniency in one respect only: if only one cartel member reported the cartel, his/her ￿ne was not only
reduced to 0; in addition, he was rewarded with the full ￿ne, F, paid by the other cartel member.
In addition to these ￿ve treatments, we also ran a number of other treatments to check the robustness
of our results to changes in ￿ and F. First, we ran two additional antitrust and leniency treatments with
higher expected ￿nes equal to 60 (￿ = 0:2 and F = 300). These treatments were denoted AntiHigh and
LenHigh respectively. Second, we ran two additional reward treatments, both with an expected ￿ne equal
to 0 (￿ = 0) but with di⁄erent ￿nes. The treatment denoted RewLow had a relatively low ￿ne (F = 200)
while RewHigh had a high ￿ne (F = 1000).
3.4 The experiment￿ s timing and the rematching procedure
At the end of each period, subjects were rematched with the same competitor with a probability of 85%.
With the remaining probability of 15%, all subjects were randomly matched into new pairs. When this
happened, the history in the previous match did no longer matter; for example, a subject could no longer be
￿ned for a cartel formed in a previous match. The subjects were also informed that the experiment would
end if more than 20 periods had passed and the 15% probability event took place or if the experiment lasted
for more than 2 hours and 30 minutes. This latter possibility was so unlikely that it never happened.
This re-matching procedure had several advantages. First, the subjects were playing truly in￿nitely
repeated games without problems associated with end e⁄ects. Second, each subject played several repeated
games against di⁄erent competitors. Thereby we observed the subjects￿behavior in a larger number of
repeated games.
Before the experiment started, the subjects were paired with the same competitor for ￿ve practice periods.
During these practice periods, subjects were assigned to di⁄erent competitors than those that they faced in
the ￿rst period of the ￿ true￿(i.e. remunerated) experiment. Participants were informed about this.
3.5 The timing of the stage game
With the exception of the Communication treatment, a stage game consisted of 7 steps. In Communica-
tion, steps 4,5 and 6 were skipped. An overview of the steps is given in Figure 1.
Step 1: Communication decision. Each subject was asked whether or not he wished to communicate
with his competitor. If both subjects pushed the yes button within 15 seconds, the game proceeded to step
2. Otherwise the two subjects had to wait for additional 30 seconds before pricing decisions were taken in
Step 3. In all periods, subjects were also informed whether they were matched with the same opponent as
in the previous round or if a re-match had taken place.
9Figure 1: Timing of the stage game
In the treatment LenRing, the ￿rst subject to push the button within the time window of 15 seconds
was treated as the ringleader. If instead only one of the subjects pushed the yes button, then this subject
was treated as a ringleader even if the cartel was formed in later periods. In either case, both subjects were
informed at the end of Step 1 about the identity of the (possibly only potential) ringleader.
Step 2: Communication. If both subjects decided to communicate in step 1, a window appeared on their
computer screen asking them to simultaneously state a minimum acceptable price in the range f0;:::;12g.
When both of them had chosen a price, they entered a second round of price negotiations, in which they
could choose a price from the new range fpmin;:::;12g, where pmin was de￿ned as the minimum among the
two prices selected in the previous negotiation round. This procedure went on until 30 seconds had passed.
The resulting minimum price pmin was referred to as the agreed upon price.
Step 3: Pricing. Each subject had to choose his price from the choice set f0;:::;12g. Possible price
agreements reached in step 2 were not binding. The subjects were informed that if they failed to choose a
price within 30 seconds, then their default price would be so high that their pro￿ts became 0.
Step 4: First Reporting Decision. If communication took place in the current period or in one of
the previous periods and had not yet been discovered by the competition authority, subjects had a ￿rst
opportunity to report the cartel.
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision. Subjects learn the prices set by their opponent.
If communication took place in the current period or in one of the previous periods and was not yet discovered
by the competition authority and nobody has reported it in step 4, subjects have again the opportunity to
report the cartel. The crucial di⁄erence between this second reporting opportunity and the ￿rst one is that
the subjects knew the price chosen by the competitor. In addition the subjects were informed about their
own pro￿ts and the pro￿ts of their competitor, gross of the possible ￿ne.
Step 6: Detection. If communication took place in the current period or in one of the previous periods
and had not yet been discovered or reported in steps 4 or 5, the competition authority discovered the cartel
with probability ￿.
Step 7: Summary of the current period. At the end of each period, all the relevant information about
the stage game was displayed: agreed upon price (if any), prices chosen by the two players, possible ￿nes
and net pro￿ts. In case players were ￿ned, they were also told how many players reported. This step lasted
20 seconds
Note that with our experimental setup subjects have two opportunities to report the cartel: ￿rst at step
4, right after having set their price, then again at step 5, after having been informed about the price chosen
by their opponent. In our design, reporting can thus be used for two di⁄erent purposes: (i) deviating subjects
may report to get protection against prosecution and (ii) cheated upon subjects may report to punish their
opponents, if they have not reported before.
3.6 Experimental procedure
Our experiment took place in March, April, May and December 2007 at the Stockholm School of Economics
(Sweden) and at Tor Vergata university (Rome, Italy). Session lasted on average 2 hours, including instruc-
tions and payment. The average payment was: (i) in Stockholm Euros 26.49, with a minimum of 15.3 and a
10maximum of 36 and (ii) in Rome Euros 24.45 with a minimum of 16.5 and a maximum of 31.5. 9We ran a
treatment for every session; the number of subjects per session ranged from 16 to 32, and the total number
of subjects was 194.
Subjects were welcomed in the lab and seated, each in front of a computer. When all subjects were
ready, a printed version of the instructions and the pro￿t table was distributed to them. Instructions were
read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the rules of the game. The subjects were then asked to read the
instructions on their own and ask questions, which were answered privately. When everybody had read the
instructions and there were no more questions (which always happened after about ￿fteen minutes), each
subject was randomly matched with another subject for the ￿ve practice rounds. After the practice rounds,
participants had again a last opportunity to ask questions about the rules of the game. Again, they were
answered privately. Then they were randomly rematched into new pairs and the real play started.
At the end of each session, the subjects were paid privately in cash. The subjects started with an initial
endowment of 1000 points in order to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. At the end of the experiment
the subjects were paid an amount equal to their cumulated earnings (including the initial endowment) plus
a show up fee of 7 Euros. The conversion rate was 200 points for 1 Euro.
3.7 Equilibrium set
In the games presented above, the equilibrium structure can be described in the following way. For each
treatment and each price that the ￿rms want to collude on, there exists a critical discount factor such that the
￿rms can collude on the desired price level if and only if the ￿rms￿discount factor is larger than the critical
discount factor. While it is not trivial to ￿nd these critical discount factors for each treatment, it is possible
to rank them. Let ￿Communication, ￿Antitrust, ￿Leniency, ￿LenRing and ￿Reward denote the critical discount
factors for the, Communication, Antitrust, Leniency, LenRing and Reward treatments respectively.
Provided that the probability of detection, ￿, and the size of the ￿ne, F, are equal in all treatments, then it
can be shown that
0 = ￿Antitrust < ￿Communiction < ￿Len = ￿LenRing < ￿Rew < 1:
The only surprising feature of this ranking is that collusion can be sustained for any discount factor in
the Antitrust treatment (￿Anti = 0). The reason is simple: in the stage game, it is a subgame perfect
equilibrium to collude. Indeed, if both ￿rms￿strategies stipulate that one should report the cartel whenever
a ￿rm unilaterally deviates from the collusive price, then it is no longer pro￿table to deviate due to the
reports. Furthermore, the reports are credible: since both ￿rms (including the deviating one) report the
cartel following a deviation, both ￿rms are indi⁄erent between reporting and not reporting, and thus reporting
is an equilibrium in the reporting subgame. Of course, the weakness of this subgame perfect equilibrium
is that it is sustained through weakly dominated strategies. When the stage game is in￿nitely repeated,
however, it is easy to construct strategies with the same ￿ avor, which are not weakly dominated.
The key to the above observation is that in the Antitrust treatment, reports can be used as punishments
against deviators. This is not the case in the other treatments. In the Communication treatment, it is
trivial that reports cannot be used. To see that reports cannot be used as punishments in the remaining
treatments, note that optimal deviations involve secret reports. Thus cartels are dismantled after unilateral
deviations and therefore reports cannot be used as punishments. For this reason, the ranking of the remaining
critical discount factor is the expected one.
3.8 Empirical Methodology
A critical point in our analysis is how to control for repeated observations of the same subject or the same
duopoly, when testing the signi￿cance of the observed di⁄erences across treatments. Before explaining more
in detail the procedure we adopted, it is useful to introduce here some terminology. We call ￿individual-level￿
9The subjects that participate in Stockholm were actually paid in Swedish kronor (SEK). At the time of the experiment, 1
SEK=0.109 Euros.
11data the data representing individual decisions of the subjects. On the contrary, we call ￿duopoly-level￿data
the data that refer to variables that always have the same value for the two members of a duopoly. Thus,
for example, the presence of a cartel within a duopoly in a given period, or the fact that a given cartel is
detected by the antitrust authority, are duopoly-level data, while the decision to communicate or not in a
given period or the decision to unilaterally deviate from a collusive agreement are individual level data, as
in every period they might take di⁄erent values for the two members of a duopoly.
Given the structure of our game, we need to account for correlation between two observations from the
same individual, as well as correlation between two observations from di⁄erent individuals who belong to the
same duopoly. Moreover, since we have run the experiment in two di⁄erent cities, we also have to control
for the possible correlation among observations collected in the same city. To this purpose, we adopted
multilevel random e⁄ect models.
Since in our experiment a subject may take part in more than one duopoly during the game, the random
e⁄ects at the subject level and at the duopoly level are not nested, which makes it di¢ cult to estimate a
model with a random e⁄ect at the duopoly level and a random e⁄ect at the subject level at the same time.
To overcome this complicacy, when analyzing individual-level data, we assume that there is a random e⁄ect
for every subject within any particular match ￿ which accounts for the correlation among observations
belonging to the same match. To take into consideration also the possible correlation among observations
relative to the same subject in di⁄erent matches, we hypothesize that there is a second random e⁄ect for
every subject across di⁄erent matches. Finally, we conjecture a third random e⁄ect at the city level.
To analyze duopoly-level data we make the assumption that correlation between observations belonging
to the same subject but to di⁄erent duopolies can be disregarded. We therefore hypothesize to have only a
random e⁄ect at the duopoly level, nested with a random e⁄ect at the city level.
The only independent variable of our simple regressions is the treatment, as a dummy. To analyze
individual-level data, we adopt a four-levels model of the following form:







where h, i , j and k are indices for measurement occasions, subjects in matches, subjects across matches and
cities, respectively. TREAT is the dummy variable for the treatment. Since we always compare only two
treatments at a time, this variable takes value 1 in correspondence of one of the two treatments, and value 0
in correspondence of the other one. ￿
(2)
ijk represents the random intercept for subject j in match i, and in city
k (second level), ￿
(3)
jk represents the random intercept for subject j in city k (third level) and ￿
(4)
k represents
the random intercept for city k (fourth level). Random intercepts are assumed to be independently normally
distributed, with a variance that is estimated through our regression.
The general three-levels model we adopt when looking at duopoly-level data has the following form:










k represent random intercepts at the duopoly and city levels.
We ran logit regressions to analyze the decision to communicate, the decision to deviate, and the rates
of cartel formation and of cartel detection; we adopted instead linear regressions for prices and agreed upon
prices. To estimate our model we used an ordinary panel regression with random e⁄ect, when the number
of considered levels was equal to 2, while we used GLLAMM (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004 and
http://www.gllamm.org) when the number of considered levels was equal or higher than three.
4 Results
4.1 Traditional and modern law enforcement
In this section we report the subjects￿behavior in the Communication, Antitrust and Leniency treat-
ments. The purpose is to assess how traditional antitrust law (Antitrust) and more modern law enforce-
ment institutions embedded with a leniency program (Leniency) perform relative to a laisser faire regime
12(Communication). Our primary interest is to document how these di⁄erent policies perform in terms of
ex ante deterrence and their implications for the subjects￿price choices. In addition we also report post
conviction deterrence and prices, that is whether cartelists, after having been convicted, are deterred from
reforming the dismantled cartel. We postpone our analysis of the LenRing and Reward treatments to two
subsequent sections.
4.1.1 Cartel Deterrence
Table 3 reports the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation provided that subjects are
not currently cartel members. These rates are our main measures for evaluating the success of the di⁄erent
policies in terms of ex ante deterrence, that is the main objective of Antitrust policies.10
Result 1 (Ex ante deterrence) Traditional antitrust laws (Antitrust) are e⁄ective in deterring explicit
cartel formation and modern antitrust laws (Leniency) even more so.
Table 3: Deterrence e⁄ects11
Communication Antitrust Leniency
Rate of communication 0.835 >￿￿ 0.566 >￿￿￿ 0.377
attempts
Rate of cartel formation 0.716 >￿￿￿ 0.315 >￿￿￿ 0.178
Rate of individual deviation 0.564 >￿￿￿ 0.424 ￿ 0.373
Rate of reporting ￿ ￿ 0.092 <￿￿￿ 0.507
Note: In this table and in the following ones, the symbols ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
Result 1 stems from the fact that the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation are
signi￿cantly lower in Antitrust than in Communication. Moreover Leniency was even more successful
in terms of ex ante deterrence since the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation were
signi￿cantly lower in Leniency than in Antitrust. Relative to Communication, the rates of individual
communication attempts decreased by 31% in Antitrust and by 56% in Leniency. These di⁄erences
were even more striking for the rates of cartel formation, with a 55% and 77% decrease in Antitrust and
Leniency respectively. This is line with Miller￿ s (2007) estimate that leniency may be associated with
a 52 percent decrease in the rate at which cartels form. These results are also (partly) consistent with
previous experimental results. Apesteguja et al. do ￿nd a reduction in the percentage of formed cartels
(from 67% to 50%) when Leniency is introduced (compared to the case when ￿rms can report but there is no
reduced ￿ne). Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006) ￿nd a similar pattern as we do concerning the rate of cartel
formation although they observe no signi￿cant di⁄erences between their antitrust and leniency treatments
with respect to the rate of communication attempts.
10For the Rate of communication the single observation is the binary individual decision to communicate of a subject in
every single period. Similarly, for the Rate of individual deviation the single observation is represented by the individual
decision to deviate from the last collusive agreement. Here we consider only the cases in which the subjects had previously
formed an agreement on prices.
For the Rate of cartel formation we have a single observation per duopoly per period, which indicates if in that period
a cartel has been formed within that duopoly. We consider only the cases in which no cartel pre-existed. For the Rate of
reporting we consider only the cases in which a cartel exists. We have a single observation per duopoly per period, which
indicates whether the cartel has been discovered in that period because at least one of the two cartel members reported it to
the antitrust authority.
As explained above, we used a multilevel random intercept model to evaluate the signi￿cance of the observed di⁄erences.
We adopted a four (three)-level random intercept logistic regression when using individual (duopoly)-level data. We ran a
regression per each couple of treatments.
11Our results are not perfectly comparable with those of Hinloopen and Soetevent because they report the rate of commu-
nication for all periods while we report the rate of communication provided that no cartel has been formed previously.
13Table 3 also reports the rates of detection due to self reporting by subjects - a ￿rst source of cartel
instability. The rate of reporting is small in Antitrust while it increases substantially and signi￿cantly in
Leniency. Hence:
Result 2 (Cartel stability and self-reporting) Modern antitrust laws (Leniency) reduce cartel stabil-
ity due to self reporting.
Result 2 is in line with Miller￿ s (2007) conclusion that leniency programs are associated with a 62%
increase in the rate of detection, even though we observe an even higher increase. This is also consistent
with Aspeteguja et al. who ￿nd an increase of 50% of the detection rate.
Our experimental design also allows us to distinguish between di⁄erent motives behind reporting behavior.
As already mentioned, subjects can either report in order to protect themselves against ￿nes using the ￿rst
reporting opportunity or they can report and punish their competitor after having observed the competitor￿ s
price choice. Clearly, we should expect to observe the former type of reports in Leniency only. By contrast,
the latter opportunity to report in order to punish deviators may be observed both in Antitrust and
Leniency, although one may argue that reports to punish should be rare in both treatments. In Antitrust,
subjects may ￿nd it too costly to report and in Leniency, an optimal deviation involves a simultaneous
secret report, implying that a cheated upon subject should not be able to punish by reporting.
Table 4 reports the probability of using the ￿rst and second reports in Antitrust and Leniency. As
expected, the probability of using the ￿rst report in Antitrust is very low. However subjects in Antitrust
used costly second reports to punish defectors in almost 30 % of the cases they were cheated upon. Thus
some subjects were willing to take a quite large cost in order to punish deviators. Whether this re￿ ected
that these few subjects used optimal punishments or altruistic punishment as described by Fehr and G￿tcher
(2002) is an open question.12
Table 4: Self reporting
Treatment Antitrust1 Leniency1
Number of reports (% of possibilities to report) 60 (4.7%) 195 (35.6%)
Number of First In total 4 168
Reports Simultaneous deviation 1 140
In total 56 27
Number of Second At least one deviated 54 27
Reports Only rival deviated 46 13
Rival deviated more 7 1
In Leniency, the probability to use the ￿rst secret reporting stage when simultaneous undercutting
of the agreed upon price is slightly more than 70%. This is consistent with optimal deviations and the
"protection gains ￿nes motive". Still a non-negligible number of subjects in Leniency were reluctant to use
optimal deviations or cheap punishments. In almost 30 % of the cases when subjects deviated, they did not
simultaneously report. In more than 50 % of the cases a rival deviated without reporting simultaneously, the
cheated upon subject did not punish the defector by reporting the cartel.
Finally, Table 3 reports the rates of deviation from agreed upon prices - a second source of cartel in-
stability.
Result 3 (Cartel stability and rate of deviation) Both traditional (Antitrust) and modern (Leni-
ency) antitrust laws increase cartel stability by reducing the rate of deviations from agreed upon
prices.
12Fehr and G￿tcher (2002) analyse a repeated one shot public good game experiment and argue that subjects are willing to
bear the cost of punishing free riders. They explain that "Free riding may cause strong negative emotions among the cooperators
and these emotions, in turn, may trigger their willingness to punish the free riders". Their experimental evidence gives stronger
support to the hypothesis of altruistic punishments. In their experiment the individual punisher never meets the same subject
again and thus the observed patten cannot be explained by optimal punishments.
14Result 3 stems from the fact that the rate of deviation in both the Antitrust and Leniency treatments
are signi￿cantly lower than in the Communication treatment. This suggests that antitrust polices may
generate trust among subjects, provided that none of the subjects have previously reported the cartel. As we
will see when we next comment on the subjects￿price choices, this observation implies that current antitrust
policies are not unambiguously positive despite the fact they increase ex ante cartel deterrence (and, in the
Leniency treatment also the probability of detection due to higher rates of self reporting).
4.1.2 Prices
The ultimate objective of antitrust law enforcement is to generate low prices. Table 5 presents for our ￿rst
three treatments the average price, the average price within cartels, the agreed upon price and the average
price given that subjects do not communicate. The ￿rst lesson to be drawn from this table is that cartel
deterrence is desirable, since it reduces prices. Indeed, for each treatment in Table 5, prices within cartels
are higher than the prices without communication. (Although not reported, these di⁄erences are statistically
signi￿cant.) Combined with our earlier ￿nding that Antitrust reduces the rate of cartel formation relative
to Communication and that Leniency further reduces that rate, it suggests that average prices should be
highest in Communication followed by Antitrust and lowest in Leniency. If anything, our data suggests
the reverse:
Table 5: Price levels
Communication Antitrust Leniency
Average price 4.913 ￿ 5.348 >￿￿￿ 4.844
Price within cartels 4.971 <￿￿￿ 6.114 <￿￿ 7.024
Agreed upon price 7.689 <￿￿￿ 8.242 ￿ 8.218
Price without communication 3.227 ￿ 3.890 ￿ 4.013
Note: For the Average price, a single observation is represented by the average among the prices chosen in a
period by the two members of a duopoly. The same is true for Price within cartels, but here we only consider
the cases in which the members of a duopoly have formed a cartel which has not been detected or reported yet.
For Agreed upon prices we only consider the cases in which the subjects have communicated and found an
agreement on the price to set. A single observation is given by the agreed upon price per duopoly, per period. For
Price without communication we restrict our analysis to the cases in which no communication has taken place
in the present period, and any possible previous agreement on prices has already been broken. A single observation
is represented by the average among the prices chosen by the two members of a duopoly, in every single period.
As explained above, we used a three-level random intercept linear model to compare the results across treatments
since the analysis here concerns duopoly-level data. We ran a regression per each couple of treatments.
Result 4 (Average prices) Both traditional (Antitrust) and modern (Leniency) antitrust laws appear
ine⁄ective in reducing average prices.
Result 4 stems from the fact that average prices, relative to Communication, are higher in Antitrust
or only slightly lower (although not signi￿cantly so) in Leniency. This pattern thus suggests that both
traditional and modern policies embedded with a leniency program are counter productive and might increase
prices. The main driving force behind this result is that these policies appear to increase cartel stability (as
noted in Result 3) and naturally this translates into higher prices within cartels (see Table 5).
Result 5 (Prices within cartels - what does not kill us makes us stronger) Both traditional (An-
titrust) and modern (Leniency) antitrust laws increase cartel prices signi￿cantly.
Spagnolo (2000b), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001, 2006) and Ellis and Wilson (2001) suggested that
antitrust policies embedded with a leniency program could have the e⁄ect of stabilizing those cartels that
are not deterred. Their idea was that reporting could be used as a punishment against deviators, since
reporting is less costly with a leniency program. This potential explanation for the high cartel prices in
Leniency is not completely convincing in the context of our experiment; since we allowed for secret reports,
15deviators could in e⁄ect protect themselves against such punishments. In fact, one may argue that reports
as threats against deviators should be more relevant in Antitrust, since optimal punishments in that
treatment involve reports. However, since we observed very few reports in Antitrust (although most of
these few reports were used as punishments against deviators), it seems unlikely that reports as a threat
against deviators were the main explanation for the high cartel prices in Antitrust.
In our view it seems more reasonable that antitrust policies generate trust among cartel members provided
that the cartels are not reported. It is also interesting to note that cartel prices are signi￿cantly higher in
Leniency than in Antitrust. This pattern suggests that the tougher the policy, the larger is the potential
for generating trust among cartel members.
It is also interesting to note that the price levels for non cartel members appear to be higher (although
insigni￿cantly so) in the Antitrust and Leniency treatments than in the Communication treatments. One
possible interpretation of this pattern is that a refusal to communicate when it is costly to do so, does not
signal as clearly an unwillingness to cooperate. As a result, current antitrust policies may also facilitate tacit
collusion. It should be emphasized, however, that because of higher deterrence, average prices overall are
not signi￿cantly higher in the Antitrust and Leniency treatments.
4.1.3 High expected ￿nes
To test the robustness of our ￿ndings to changes in ￿ and F, we ran the two additional treatments, AntiHigh
and LenHigh with higher expected ￿nes of 60 (￿ = 0:2 and F = 300). Table 6 reports the rates of
communication attempts and of cartel formation as well as average prices and prices within and outside
cartels. These ￿gures are compared with those for our original treatments, Antitrust and Leniency.
The ￿rst lesson from this table is that higher expected ￿nes increase deterrence and reduce average prices
under traditional antitrust laws but not under modern laws embedded with a leniency program. The reason
is probably that the expected ￿ne mostly increased through an increase in the probability of detection -
this probability was doubled while the size of the ￿ne increased by 50 % only - and that under leniency,
many cartels are reported irrespective of the probability of detection, thereby reducing subjects sensitivity
to changes in that probability. Note also that the prices within cartels increased in the leniency treatment
but not in the antitrust treatment.
Table 6: High expected ￿nes
Antitrust AntiHigh LenHigh Leniency
Rate of comm. dec. 0.590 >￿￿ 0.452 ￿ 0.435 ￿ 0.344
Rate of cartel form. 0.316 >￿￿￿ 0.195 ￿ 0.163 ￿ 0.146
Average price 4.34 >￿ 4.00 >￿ 3.65 ￿ 3.93
Price within cartels 5.03 ￿ 5.22 <￿￿ 6.21 >￿ 5.49
Price without communication 3.32 ￿ 3.20 ￿ 3.17 ￿ 3.46
4.1.4 Post-conviction behavior
In this section we analyze agents￿behavior after they are convicted and ￿ned for a cartel they had formed
before. This is interesting for at least two important and related reasons. The ￿rst reason is that any law
enforcement policy should generate, beside a general ex ante deterrence, an ex post deterrence, some times
called desistance in the antitrust literature: the policy should ensure that convictions stop the convicted
wrongdoer(s) from committing the crime again. The crucial question here is, therefore, how do convictions,
in general and in particular when generated by di⁄erent law enforcement policies (presence of leniency, size
of ￿nes), a⁄ect agents￿following decision whether to form another cartel and - whether or not a new cartel
is formed - their price choices? The topic is particularly interesting for antitrust in light of Sproul￿ s (1993)
empirical ￿nding that for a sample of US antitrust indictments prices often rose after antitrust conviction
(see also the discussion in Whinston 2006).
16The second related reason why post-conviction behavior is important is that a number of recent studies,
theoretical and experimental, suggest that in oligopolistic industries the payment of a large sunk cost by
competitors may lead to an increase in prices, either because the sunk cost acts as a coordination device
for explicit or tacit collusion (e.g. O⁄erman and Potters 2006; Janssen 2006), or because agents are subject
to a ￿ sunk-cost bias￿ , that is, they use simple mark-up pricing rules of thumb to try to recover the costs
sunk by charging a higher markup (see e.g. Baliga et al. 2006, who also describe how the best business
administration textbooks in fact suggest these pricing rules based on average cost and mark ups as optimal
ones). Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) noted that if these e⁄ects were present and signi￿cant in oligopolies,
then the existing theory of optimal ￿nes could not be applied to cartels as commonly done in the antitrust
debate (it would be misleading): it should ￿rst be extended to incorporate these e⁄ects in the evaluation of
the costs and bene￿ts trade o⁄s that lead to the optimal ￿nes.
Ex post deterrence (or ￿ desistance￿ ) Figure 2 shows the cumulative number of new cartels (vertical
axis) formed by convicted agents in the ￿ve periods following the conviction (horizontal axis), separately
for our Antitrust and Leniency treatments. The plots are slightly ￿ optimistic￿ , in the sense that some of the
matches end before the ￿ve periods after conviction considered, possibly leading to a slight underestimation
of the number of cartels that form again after conviction. Still, the data tell us quite a lot.
Figure 2: % of cartels re-established
First, there is a large fraction of agents that do not form new cartels after having been convicted and
￿ned for a ￿rst cartel, even though our treatments are designed so that agents￿situation in terms of expected
￿nes, discount factors, available actions and payo⁄ functions after a conviction is exactly identical to that
before the ￿rst convicted cartel was formed. What di⁄ers after a conviction is only the history of play, as
agents now have played several rounds, formed one or more cartels, and were convicted and ￿ned. If history
or agents￿experience did not matter, so that ￿ bygones are bygones￿ , in our stationary framework we would
expect all ￿ rational￿agents that chose to form a cartel a ￿rst time and were convicted and ￿ned to form a
new cartel the period after conviction. Instead, more than half of former cartelist did not form a new cartel
periods days after the conviction. This suggests that history and experience matter a lot in our experiment.
Second, there is a strong di⁄erence between the ex post deterrence e⁄ects of Antitrust and Leniency: close
to 40% of convicted cartels come to life again in Antitrust treatments, but not in Leniency treatments. In
other words, in our experiment the introduction of leniency policies produces a strong increase in desistance.
Leniency policies appear much better at reducing recidivism than standard antitrust policies without leniency.
This result is in stark contrast with Hinloopen and Soetevent (2006), who in their experiment ￿nd no
17improvement in desistance linked to the introduction of leniency policies. The reason behind their opposite
result, in our view, is most likely due to their experimental set up not allowing for secretly reporting and
simultaneously deviating from cartel agreement, as is possible in our experiment and in reality. As we have
seen before, in our experiment most of convictions in Leniency treatments are linked to agents simultaneously
undercutting cartel price and self-reporting. This joint action is likely to generate substantial more distrust
among agents than a discovery by the competition authority, and thereby to make substantially more di¢ cult
for convicted agents to trust each other again.
Post-conviction prices In his paper on the e⁄ects of antitrust indictments on prices charged after the
indictment - in the absence of an e⁄ective leniency program - Sproul (1993) ￿nds that:
1. On average prices rise gradually after an indictment for price ￿xing.
2. The largest immediate drops in price after conviction are about 9-10 percent.
3. Post-conviction prices are negatively correlated with the severity of penalties.
Sproul suggests that some of the cartels he analyzes could involve e¢ ciencies, and imputes the increase
in average prices to a loss of these e¢ ciencies. A comparison between his results and ours, particularly under
Antitrust treatments (there was no serious leniency program at the time of the cartels studied by Sproul)
might help to understand some aspects of the phenomenon under analysis.
Figure 3 shows price choices in cartels before conviction (conviction takes place at time 0) and after
conviction, separately for convicted agents that have formed again a new cartel and by those that did not
do it, and for Antitrust and Leniency treatments. The stylized facts that emerge from our experiment are
the following:
Figure 3: Price before and after detection
a) Prices after conviction are on average lower than in cartels before conviction.
b) When cartels are re-established after conviction, prices stabilize at levels close to that prevailing in
the cartel the period when the cartel was convicted.
18c) When cartels are not re-established, prices fall substantially with respect to the prevailing cartel price
at the time of conviction, and remain low.
d) Post-conviction prices are higher in Leniency than in Antitrust treatments when a new cartel is formed
after conviction, while the opposite happens when a new cartel is not formed after conviction.
The fact that average prices within cartels that are restored after conviction remain close to the level
observed in the period in which the previous cartel was detected, whether leniency is granted to the whis-
tleblowers or not, appears consistent with Sproul￿ s (1993) ￿ndings given that in our framework there are no
e¢ ciencies linked to collusion. Somewhat in contrast to Sproul (1993) we also ￿nd that in the large number
of cases where a novel cartel is not formed after conviction prices fall much below the level reached in the
period in which detection took place, which drives down average post-conviction prices. True, this happens
much more often in Leniency treatments than in Antitrust ones, and prices when new cartels do not form
are much lower in Leniency than in Antitrust treatments, while at the time of Sproul￿ s cartels an e⁄ective
leniency policy was not in place. Still, even focussing only on Antitrust treatments, it appears that prices
fall on average after conviction. On the other hand, to explain why in his sample prices do not fall after
indictment, Sproul hypothesizes that ￿the government mainly prosecutes cost-reducing cartels￿ . Such an
interpretation is not questioned by our data, since in our experiment cartels have no e⁄ects on costs.
As for the e⁄ects of Leniency, it appears to have the novel e⁄ect of strongly increasing desistance thereby
reducing average prices, even though prices are substantially higher in cartels that manage to form again
after a conviction caused by a leniency application.
The di⁄erence that arises between Leniency treatments and Antitrust treatments when players decide
not to form a new cartel after being detected is also interesting (stylized fact d)). While under Leniency the
average price remains close to Bertrand and to the level observed before the (detected) cartel arose, under
Antitrust average non-collusive prices after detection rise as if ￿after having formed an explicit cartel and
having experienced the ￿ne ￿some of the subjects try to reach a tacit agreement on prices. A possible
interpretation of this e⁄ect is that under Antitrust detection does not a⁄ect trust between cartelists, while
under Leniency detection and defection are often simultaneous, and the cartel is discovered because it is
reported by the deviating player; therefore, post-conviction tacit collusion is more di¢ cult to achieve under
Leniency.
Size of the ￿ne and post-conviction prices: ￿ sunk cost bias￿and coordination e⁄ects The idea
here is that antitrust ￿nes might be viewed as a sunk cost by the convicted subjects. The literature has
discussed the possible coordination role of sunk costs (e.g. O⁄erman and Potters 2006) and the existence
of a ￿ sunk cost bias￿in decision making, where agents try to recover sunk ￿xed cost by increasing a mark
up on the average cost chosen when setting the unit price (Baliga et al. 2004). To distinguish the two
e⁄ects, we hypothesized that the ￿rst e⁄ect should imply improved coordination in general, and therefore
also in newly formed cartels. Table 7 reports post conviction prices from our experiment, in newly formed
cartels and outside, and the level of the ￿nes levied on convicted agents. Consistently with one of Sproul￿ s
￿nding, we observe a negative (though not always signi￿cant) correlation between the size of the ￿ne and
post-conviction prices. In our experiment this e⁄ect is somehow puzzling, since even before getting ￿ned
our subjects were informed about the size of the ￿ne and the probability of detection, so if they were fully
rational they should not change their behavior after detection. A deeper analysis is required to understand
the reasons that lead to this ￿nding.13
We observe that post conviction prices are generally lower when the ￿ne (and the expected ￿ne) is
higher, both within cartels and outside cartels, whether leniency is granted to the ￿whistleblowers￿or not.
Consequently, our evidence seems to contradict the hypothesis of a sunk cost bias, which would a⁄ect prices
of ￿rms that choose not to re-establish a cartel after being ￿ned; our results are also against the hypothesis
of a coordination e⁄ect of the ￿ne for cartels restored right after their detection.
To test the signi￿cance of the observed di⁄erence in post conviction prices between Antitrust and An-
tiHigh, and between Leniency and LenHigh, we estimated a three level random e⁄ect linear model using
GLLAMM, following the procedure explained in section 3.6. As mentioned above, this procedure allows us
13To investigate this matter, we ran some other related experiments￿whose results will be presented in a companion paper.
19Table 7: Size of the ￿ne and post-conviction pricing
Treatment Fine Prices outside cartels Prices within cartels
Antitrust 200 4.418 7.297
￿ _￿
AntiHigh 300 3.310 5.750
Leniency 200 3.776 6.732
￿ ￿
LenHigh 300 3.181 4.700
to keep into account the correlation between observations from the same duopoly, and also the correlation
between observations from the same city. We notice that the di⁄erences we observe are economically, but
not statistically signi￿cant in most of the cases. According to our results, the di⁄erence in post conviction
prices between Leniency and LenHigh is not signi￿cant, neither within cartels nor outside cartels. On
the other hand, the di⁄erence between prices observed in Antitrust and AntiHigh is signi￿cant, but only
outside cartels. This lack of statistical signi￿cance may be due to the sample size, which is very small since
we restrict our analysis only to the cases in which a cartel was discovered and dismantled in the previous
period.
4.2 Ineligibility for Cartel Ringleader14
Under the US Corporate Leniency Policy, a ￿rm is ineligible for amnesty if it is the instigator of the cartel
- the so called ringleader. In order to qualify for amnesty, the policy requires that the "corporation did not
coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or the originator
of, the activity" (Corporate Leniency Policy, supra note 58). By contrast, and following the revision of the
EU Leniency Notice in 2002, also the ringleader is eligible for amnesty in the EU. Whether or not ineligibility
of the ringleader has desirable consequences in terms of deterrence and prices is not clear cut. Excluding the
ringleader from the leniency program may increase deterrence if each ￿rm wait for some other ￿rm to take
the initiative of forming the cartel. As noted by Leslie (2006), however, extending amnesty to the ringleader
may increase deterrence as well by ensuring that even the ringleader cannot be completely trusted, as it may
also loose con￿dence and rush to report under the leniency program.15
Table 8: Deterrence e⁄ects
Leniency LenRing
Rate of communication attempts 0.344 ￿ 0.290
Rate of cartel formation 0.146 ￿ 0.135
Rate of individual deviation 0.472 >￿￿￿ 0.230
Rate of detection 0.646 >￿￿￿ 0.289
To evaluate the pros and cons of ringleader ineligibility, we ran the additional treatment, LenRing. Tables
8 and 9 compare the e⁄ects on deterrence and on price levels of eliminating the possibility of amnesty for the
ringleader. Three features are striking in these tables. First, the LenRing treatment has no signi￿cant e⁄ect
on cartel deterrence relative to the Leniency treatment. Second, cartels appear to become more stable and
third the LenRing treatment increase prices signi￿cantly according to all our price measure. These ￿ndings
are summarized in the next result 16.
14We thank Joe Harrington for suggesting this treatment.
15There are other arguments for and against the ineligibility of ringleaders. Extending leniency to the ringleader may be
important to elicit self-reporting, as it may not be that clear to a ￿rm considering whether to apply for leniency if it risks being
regarded as ringleader. On the other hand, in an adversarial system, where testimony is crucial to persuade juries, testimony
by a ringleader may not be convincing.
16Treatment LenRing was run only in Rome. For sake of consistency, in tables 8 and 9 we only consider observations gathered
20Result 7 (Ringleader) If the ringleader is excluded from the leniency program, the deterrence e⁄ect of
leniency falls and prices are higher than otherwise.
Result 7 thus suggests that the US practice of excluding the ringleader from the leniency program is
unambiguously bad in our set up. While we ￿nd this result an interesting ￿rst step, that con￿rms some
observers￿concerns that excluding ringleaders may reduce the e⁄ectiveness of the leniency program, we should
also emphasize one important caveat. In our experiment subjects were matched pairwise into duopolies to
avoid social preferences e⁄ects towards non-defecting third parties.
Table 9: Price levels
Leniency LenRing
Average price 3.926 <￿￿￿ 4.847
Price within cartels 5.494 <￿￿￿ 7.284
Agreed upon price 7.099 ￿ 7.833
Price without communication 3.457 <￿￿￿ 3.912
This, however, is the worst conceivable situation for the US policy of excluding ringleaders, as the ban
leaves only one cartel member with the option to self-report obtaining leniency, eliminating the incentives to
"race to report" generated by the risk that another cartel member could do it before. With more than two
￿rms, therefore, it is likely that LenRing treatment will show more desirable properties. Therefore, further
experimental research with many cartel members is needed to attempt any policy conclusion on this feature.
4.3 Rewards
So far we have only considered policies that have been extensively implemented in reality. Given that none
of these policies yielded fully satisfactory results, it is natural to turn attention to policies that have been
advocated in the literature on optimal law enforcement. The type of policy that we consider here is one
where the reporting subject gets rewarded by an amount equal to the ￿ne paid by its rival.17 Tables 10 and
11 compare the e⁄ects on deterrence and on price levels of introducing such reward schemes.
Result 6 (Ex post deterrence) Cartels are systematically reported in the Reward treatment.
This result is corroborated by Table 10 showing that the rate of detection due to reporting is almost equal
to one in the Reward treatment. In fact, a simple inspection of the data in the Reward treatment reveals
that almost every time a cartel was formed, at least one of the subjects reported it: out of the 120 times
a cartel was formed, the cartel was reported during the ￿rst period in 118 cases. In one of the remaining
cases, it was reported in the subsequent period, while there was only a single duopoly in which the players
resisted the temptation of reporting and managed to sustain the collusive agreement for seven consecutive
periods. This cartel ended because a re-matching took place.
Table 10: Deterrence e⁄ects
Antitrust Reward Leniency
Rate of communication 0.566 >￿￿￿ 0.484 >￿￿￿ 0.377
attempts
Rate of cartel formation 0.315 >￿￿￿ 0.220 ￿ 0.178
Rate of individual deviation 0.424 <￿￿￿ 0.781 >￿￿￿ 0.373
Rate of detection 0.092 <￿￿￿ 0.937 >￿￿￿ 0.507
in Rome for treatment Leniency as well.
17Korea is the only country we are aware of that adopts this kind of reward schemes for whistleblowers in antitrust; analogous
schemes are however used in other ￿elds of law enforcement, particularly in the US.
21There are two potential explanations to this phenomenon. First the subjects could in principle exploit
the reward system by taking turns in reporting and cashing in the reward. The second hypothesis, ￿rst
proposed by Apesteguja et al, is that subjects form a cartel with the hope of fooling their competitor by
undercutting the agreed-upon price and by reporting the cartel in order to cash in the reward. The next
result con￿rms this latter hypothesis.
Result 7 (Cartel stability) The antitrust policy with rewards signi￿cantly reduces cartel stability.
This result is re￿ ected by the fact that the rate of individual deviation increased substantially in the
Reward treatment. Note also that at least one subject undercut the agreed upon price in 111 out of the 118
cartels that only lasted one period.
Table 10 also suggests that the antitrust policy with rewards is not more e¢ cient in deterring cartels
ex ante than the traditional policies. Indeed the rates of communication attempts and of cartel formation
in the Reward treatment are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from corresponding rates in the Antitrust and
Leniency treatments. Nevertheless:
Result 7 (Ex ante deterrence) The antitrust policy with reward strongly deters explicit cartel formation,
the more the longer subjects play.
Result 7 is explained by the fact that the subjects eventually learned that it was not possible to form
cartels for the purpose of cashing in the reward and, as a result, the number of formed cartels was reduced
drastically. This appears clearly in Figure 4 showing that the number of cartels formed were reduced as
subjects were re-matched.
Figure 4: Rates of cartel formation and communication attempts in the four matches of the Reward treat-
ment.
Result 8 (Prices) The antitrust policy with rewards strongly reduces both prices in explicit cartels and
subjects￿ability to collude tacitly.
22Table 11: Price levels
Antitrust Reward Leniency
Average price 5.348 ￿ 3.975 ￿ 4.844
Price within cartels 6.144 >￿￿ 5.339 <￿￿￿ 7.024
Agreed upon price 8.242 ￿ 8.512 ￿ 8.218
Price without communication 3.890 ￿ 3.565 ￿ 4.013
The systematic reports when subjects took part in cartels probably undermined trust among the subjects
and, as a result, also prices dropped (though not signi￿cantly) in the Reward treatment. This is most striking
in Table 11 where all measures of prices are the lowest in the Reward treatment. In particular, prices also
dropped when subjects did not communicate. Thus prices were not only low because cartels were deterred
from forming, giving further support for the claim that the systematic reports undermined trust. Rewarding
whistleblowers appears therefore the only antitrust policy able to reduce price and increase welfare in our
experimental set up.18
In theory, and contrary to any previous result in the economic literature on law enforcement, it is possible
to achieve the ￿rst best of full deterrence with ￿nite ￿nes and no inspection probability using reward schemes
(Spagnolo, 2000, 2004). To verify this we ran a further treatment RewLow, identical to Reward but for
the probability of detection that we set at zero (￿ = 0). The results showed that some agents still need to
try a couple of times to induce others to form a cartel just to report and cash the bonus. After a couple
of attempts they learn that with the whistleblower reward scheme everybody reports immediately once a
cartel forms, so that entering a cartel is never pro￿table, and cartels disappear. The ￿rst best is therefore
only achieved in asymptotic form. Indeed, after enough learning the subjects appear to converge to the
￿rst best. We also run a second treatment RewHigh, exactly equal to RewLow but for the ￿ne, which
was higher (F = 1000). In this last treatment we observed a further increase in deterrence (the rate of
communication attempts dropped to 25.9%, and the rate of cartel formation was 7.8%). Yet, full deterrence
was not achieved even in this treatment, because at least some of the players still tried to form a cartel and
to fool their opponent by deviating from the agreement and simultaneously reporting it.
As a ￿nal remark we stress that the results of our treatments with rewards forcefully con￿rm the im-
portance of learning in experimental settings with complicated/realistic games if we compare to those of
Apesteguja et al. (2007). In particular, the results show that the preliminary and strange conclusion by
Apesteguja et al. (2006) - that Rewards are not more e⁄ective than Leniency - was premature and due to
the subjects￿inability to learn in that set up, as these authors already conjectured.
4.4 Culture, Trust and Antitrust
We run our experiments in Stockholm and in Rome, two towns with quite distinct cultures. It is not obvious
that one or the other culture should lead to more cartels given the legal framework, as our experiment was
framed, cartel formation was presented as illegal, and Swedes are thought to be more law abiding than
Italians. This would point at Italians colluding more. On the other hand, according to the World Values
Survey (1999), there are important di⁄erences between Sweden and Italy that may point in a di⁄erent
direction. In particular, when they were asked whether "information to help justice should be given to the
authorities", 40.2 % of the Italians strongly agreed when only 26% of Swedes do. Moreover a majority of
18Note that we designed the reward scheme in such a way that it could be exploited by cartel members: the scheme is such
that if cartel members took turns in self-reporting and cashing the reward, the expected ￿ne would be zero (Spagnolo 2004, 2006
makes it clear that - for this reason - in reality the whistleblower￿ s reward should always be strictly smaller than the sum of ￿nes
paid by the other wrongdoers, so that there exist no possibility to manipulate/exploit the scheme). Still, none of our subject
appear to have realized this opportunity, a result that con￿rm that some legal scholar￿ s claims that reward schemes could be
manipulated are unfounded empirically, besides being incorrect theoretically when the scheme is appropriately designed (by an
economist). The result is consistent with Dal Bo￿ s (2005) ￿nding that asymmetric (alternating) actions cooperative equilibria in
the repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma are never played by experimental agents even when they are way more e¢ cient than standard,
stationary cooperative equilibria.
23Swedes (63.7%) think that "people can be trusted" while only 31.8% Italian agreed. The di⁄erence in the
answers to the ￿rst question suggests that leniency programs could be more e⁄ective in Italy. The di⁄erence
in the answers to the second question suggest that Swedes are more con￿dent in the cooperation of partners,
so that they are more likely to coordinate on collusive/cooperative equilibria.
Separating treatments according to location we found results consistent with the di⁄erences in answers
to the World Value Surveys: Swedes collude more often, coordinate on higher prices, and deviates much
less often than Italians. In all treatments prices lower and cartels less frequent in Italy than in Sweden,
and defection and applications to leniency are much more frequent in Italy. According to our results, nordic
countries may be in more need of antitrust enforcement because of their ￿ cooperative￿culture than southern
ones.
5 Conclusions
This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine the e⁄ects of ￿nes, leniency programs,
and reward schemes for whistleblowers on ￿rms￿decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and on their
price choices. We consider an experiment in which subjects play a repeated Bertrand price game with
di⁄erentiated goods, running several treatments di⁄erent in the probability of cartels being caught, the level
of ￿ne, the possibility of self-reporting (and not paying a ￿ne), the existence of a reward for reporting, and
cartel leaders access to leniency. We ￿nd that ￿nes following successful investigations but without leniency
have a deterrence e⁄ect (reduce the number of cartels formed) but also a pro-collusive e⁄ect (increase
collusive prices in surviving cartels). Leniency programs might not be more e¢ cient than standard antitrust
enforcement, since in our experiment they do deter a signi￿cantly higher fraction of cartels from forming, but
they induce even higher prices in those cartels that are not reported, pushing average market price higher
than without antitrust enforcement. With rewards for whistle blowing, instead, cartels are systematically
reported, which completely disrupts subjects￿ability to form cartels and sustain high prices. If the ringleader
is excluded from the leniency program the deterrence e⁄ect of leniency does not increase while prices are
higher than otherwise. As for tacit collusion, we ￿nd that under standard anti-trust enforcement or leniency
programs, subjects who do not communicate (do not go for explicit cartels) choose weakly higher prices than
where there is no anti-trust enforcement. We also analyze and post-conviction behavior, ￿nding that after
convictions caused by a report under the leniency program much fewer cartels form and prices are lower than
when conviction takes place under standard antitrust policies without leniency. Finally, we ￿nd a strong
cultural e⁄ect in the deterrence power of the various law enforcement regime when comparing treatments in
Stockholm and Rome.
Our results have policy implications for general deterrence of organized crime similar to cartels, and as
a test for the theoretical results mentioned in Section 2 (the protection from ￿nes e⁄ect, the reward e⁄ect,
the reporting as a threat and tacit collusion). Our results have only marginal implications for most of the
many other theoretical papers, including cornerstone contributions to this literature.
For example, Motta and Polo (2003), the ￿rst economic analysis on leniency programs, focuses mainly on
the e⁄ects of the second part of the leniency programs opened to ￿rms already under prosecution. The only
implication of our experimental results for that paper is that they do not support its two policy conclusions
that (i) to have deterrence e⁄ects leniency programs must be opened to ￿rms already under investigation (in
our experiment they aren￿ t), and that (ii) introducing a leniency program is a second best choice relative to
standard antitrust law enforcement if there is a large enough budget. Analogous, Harrington (forthcoming)
does not consider general deterrence but focuses on desistance e⁄ects, i.e. the ability of law enforcement
mechanism to shorten the duration of cartels that were not deterred by the mechanism. It also introduces a
stochastic movement in a law enforcement parameters to generate equilibrium applications of cartel members
to the leniency schemes. The only implication of our experimental results for that paper is that our real
world agents did form cartels and then apply for leniency in our fully deterministic, stationary oligopolistic
environment. This suggests that deterministic theoretical analyses are perfectly OK, they are not at odd
with the evidence that people form cartels and then report them.
Aubert et al. (2006) do focus on the ￿rst part of leniency programs, on general deterrence and on rewards,
24but their contribution is about the costs and bene￿ts of providing leniency and rewards to the individual
employees of colluding ￿rms. In our experiment we only have single decision makers, so we have no evidence
relevant to that issue. This sounds, however, as an exciting topic for future experimental work.
25Appendix 1: Instructions for the Leniency 1 treatment
Welcome to this experiment about decision making in a market. The experiment is expected to last for
about 1 hour and 45 minutes. You will be paid a minimum of 7 Euros for your participation. On top of that
you can earn more than 30 Euros if you make good decisions.
We will ￿rst read the instructions aloud. Then you will have time to read them on your own. If you then
have questions, raise your hand and you will be helped privately.
In summary, the situation you will face is the following. You and one other participant referred to as
your competitor produce similar goods and sell them in a common market. As in most markets, the higher
the price you charge, the more you earn on each sold good, but the fewer goods you sell. And, as in many
markets, the lower the price charged by your competitor, the more customers he or she will take away from
you and the less you will sell and earn. It is possible, however, to form a cartel with your competitor, that
is, you will have the possibility to communicate and try to agree on prices at which to sell the goods. In
reality, cartels are illegal and if the government discovers the cartel, cartel members are ￿ned. In addition
members of a cartel can always report it to the government. The same happens in this experiment. If you
communicate to discuss prices, even if both of you do not report, there is still a chance that the ￿ government￿
discovers it and if this happens, you will have to pay a ￿ ￿ne￿ . If you report, and if you are the only one
to report, you will not pay any ￿ne but your competitor will pay the full ￿ne. Conversely, if only your
competitor reports the cartel, you will pay the full ￿ne and your competitor will not pay any ￿ne. If instead
both of you report the cartel you will both pay 50% of the ￿ne.
Timing of the experiment
In this experiment you will be asked to make decisions in several periods. You will be paired with another
participant for a sequence of periods. Such a sequence of periods is referred to as a match. You will never
know with whom you have been matched in this experiment.
The length of a match is random. After each period, there is a probability of 85% that the match will
continue for at least another period. So, for instance, if you have been paired with the same competitor for
2 periods, the probability that you will be paired with him or her a third period is 85%. If you have been
paired with the same competitor for 9 periods, the probability that you will be paired with him or her a
tenth period is also 85%.
Once a match ends, you will be paired with another participant for a new
match, unless 20 periods or more have passed. In this case the experiment ends. So, for instance, if
19 periods have passed, with a probability of 15% you are re-matched, that is you are paired with another
participant. If 21 periods have passed, with a probability of 15% the experiment ends.
When you are re-matched you cannot be ￿ned anymore for a cartel formed in your previous match with
your previous competitor.
The experimental session is expected to last for about 1 hour and 45 minutes but its actual duration is
uncertain; that depends on the realization of probabilities. For this reason, we will end the experimental
session if it lasts more than 2 hours and 30 minutes.
Before the experiment starts, there will be 5 trial periods during which you will be paired with the same
competitor. These trial periods will not a⁄ect your earnings. When the experiment starts, you will be paired
with a new competitor.
Prices and Pro￿ts
In each period you choose the price of your product. Your price as well as the price chosen by your
competitor determines the quantity that you will sell.
The higher your price, the more you earn on each sold good, but the fewer goods you sell. Therefore
your price has two opposing e⁄ects on your pro￿t. On the one hand, an increase in your price may increase
your pro￿t, since each good that you sell will earn you more money. On the other hand, an increase in your
price may decrease your pro￿t, since you will sell less.
Furthermore, the higher the price of your competitor, the more you will sell. As a result, your pro￿ts
increase if your competitor chooses a higher price.
To make things easy, we have constructed a pro￿t table. This table is added to the instructions. Have
a look at this table now. Your own prices are indicated next to the rows and the prices of your competitor
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5 and your price is 4, then you ￿rst move to the right until you ￿nd the column with 5 above it, and then
you move down until you reach the row which has 4 on the left of it. You can read that your pro￿t is 160
points in that case.
Your competitor has received an identical table. Therefore you can also use the table to learn your
competitor￿ s pro￿t by inverting your roles. That is, read the price of your competitor next to the rows and
your price above the columns. In the previous example where your price is equal to 4 and your competitor￿ s
price is equal to 5, it follows that your competitor￿ s pro￿t is 100 points.
Note that if your and your competitor￿ s prices are equal, then your pro￿ts are also equal and are indicated
in one of the cells along the table￿ s diagonal. For example, if your price and the price of your competitor are
equal to 1, then your pro￿t and the pro￿t of your competitor is equal to 38 points. If both you and your
competitor increase your price by 1 point to 2, then your pro￿t and the pro￿t of your competitor becomes
equal to 71.
Note also that if your competitor￿ s price is su¢ ciently low relative to your price, then your pro￿t is equal
to 0. The reason is that no consumer buys your good, since it is too expensive relative to your competitor￿ s
good.
Fines
In every period, you and your competitor will be given the opportunity to communicate and discuss
prices. If both of you agree to communicate, you will be considered to have formed a cartel, and then you
might have to pay a ￿ne F. This ￿ne is given by:
F = 200 points
You can be ￿ned in two ways. First, you and your competitor will have the opportunity to report the
cartel. If you are the only one to report the cartel, you will not pay any ￿ne but your competitor will pay
the full ￿ne, that is 200 points. Conversely, if only your competitor reports the cartel and you do not, then
you will have to pay the full ￿ne equal to 200 points and your competitor will not pay any ￿ne. Finally, if
both of you report the cartel, you will both pay 50% of the ￿ne, that is 100 points.
Second, if neither you nor your competitor reports the cartel, the government discovers it with the
following probability.
Probability of detection = 10%.
Note that you will run the risk of paying a ￿ne as long as the cartel has not yet been discovered or
reported. Thus you may pay a ￿ne in a period even if no meeting takes place in that period. This happens
if you had a meeting in some previous period which has not yet been discovered or reported.
Once a cartel is discovered or reported, you do not anymore run the risk of paying a ￿ne in future periods,
unless you and your competitor agree to communicate again.
Earnings
The number of points you earn in a period will be equal to your pro￿t minus an eventual ￿ne or plus
an eventual reward. Note that because of the ￿ne, your earnings may be negative in some periods. Your
cumulated earnings, however, will never be allowed to become negative.
You will receive an initial endowment of 1000 points and, as the experiment proceeds, your and your
competitor￿ s decisions will determine your cumulated earnings. Note that 20 points are equal to 1 SEK.
Your cumulated earnings will be privately paid to you in cash at the end of the session.
Decision making in a period
Next we describe in more detail how you make decisions in each period. A period is divided into 7 steps.
Some steps will inform you about decisions that you and your competitor have made. In the other steps
you and your competitor will have to make decisions. In these steps, there will be a counter indicating how
many seconds are left before the experiment proceeds to the next step. If you fail to make a decision within
the time limit, the computer will make a decision for you.
Step 1: Pairing information and price communication decision
Every period starts by informing you whether or not you will play against the same competitor as in the
previous period.
Remember that if you are paired with a new competitor, you cannot be ￿ned anymore for cartels that
you formed with your previous competitors.
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communication screen will open only if BOTH you and your competitor choose the "YES" button within 15
seconds. Otherwise you will have to wait for an additional 30 seconds until pricing decisions starts in Step
3.
Step 2: Price communication
After the communication screen has opened, you can ￿discuss￿ prices by choosing a price out of the
range { 0, 1, 2, ... , 12 }. In this way you can indicate to your competitor the minimum price that you
￿nd acceptable for both of you. When both of you have chosen a price, these two prices are displayed on
the computer screen. You can then choose a new price but now this price should be greater or equal to the
smaller of the two previously chosen prices. This procedure is repeated until 30 seconds have passed. The
screen then displays the smaller of the two last chosen prices, which is referred to as the agreed-upon price.
Note, however, that in the next step, neither you nor your competitor is forced to choose the agreed-upon
price.
Step 3: Pricing decision
You and your competitor must choose one of the following prices: 0, 1, 2, ... , 12. When you choose
your price, your competitor will not observe your choice nor will you observe his or her price choice. This
information is only revealed in Step 5. The experiment proceeds after 30 seconds have passed. If you fail to
choose a price within 30 seconds, then your price is chosen so high that your pro￿ts will be 0.
The experiment proceeds to the ￿rst reporting decision in Step 4 if you communicated in Step 2 or if
in previous periods you formed a cartel not yet discovered or reported. Otherwise you have to wait for 10
seconds until market prices are revealed in Step 5.
Step 4: First (secret) reporting decision
By choosing to push the "REPORT" button, you can report that you have been communicating in the
past. As described above, if you are the only one to report, you will not pay the ￿ne; the opposite happens
if only your competitor reports; and if both of you report, you will both pay 50% of the ￿ne.
If you do not wish to report, push instead the ￿DO NOT REPORT￿button.
When you decide whether or not to report, your competitor will not observe your choice, nor will you
observe his or her choice. This information is only revealed when market prices are revealed in Step 5.
If you do not reach a decision within 10 seconds, your default decision will be ￿DO NOT REPORT￿ .
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision
In this step your and your competitor￿ s prices and pro￿ts are displayed.
In case you have formed a cartel not yet discovered or reported, the screen will also display whether
or not you or your competitor reported it in the ￿rst reporting step (Step 4). If not, you will get a new
opportunity to report.
If you wish to report, push the "REPORT" button. If you do not wish to report, push instead the ￿DO
NOT REPORT￿button.
Again, if you are the only one to report, you will not pay the ￿ne. On the contrary, f your competitor
reports and you don￿ t you will have to pay the ￿ne and he will not. If both you and your competitor report,
you will both pay 50% of the ￿ne, that is 100 points.
Step 6: Detection probability
If this step is reached, you formed a cartel either in the current period or in previous periods. Furthermore
the cartel has not yet been discovered or reported. The cartel can nevertheless be discovered. This happens
with a probability of 10%. If the cartel is discovered, you and your competitor will have to pay the full ￿ne
of 200 points.
Step 7: Summary
In this step you learn the choices made in the previous steps: your and your competitor￿ s price choices
and pro￿ts, your eventual ￿ne, your eventual reward and your earnings.
If you paid a ￿ne in this period, you will also know whether your competitor reported the cartel or the
government discovered it.
In case a cartel was detected or reported in this period, you will not run any risk of being ￿ned in future
periods, unless you and your competitor discuss prices again.
Step 7 will last for 20 seconds.
28Period ending and ending of the experimental session
After Step 7, a new period starts unless 20 or more periods have passed and the 15% probability of pair
dismantling takes place. In that case, the experiment ends.
The following time line summarizes the seven steps of each round.
Figure 5: Timing of the stage game
Throughout the experiment, a table will keep track for you of the history with your current competitor.
For each previous period played with your current competitor, this table will show your price and pro￿t,
your competitor￿ s price and pro￿t as well as your eventual ￿ne.
Payments
At the end of the experiment, your earnings in points will be exchanged in SEK. In addition you will be
paid the show up fee of 50 SEK.
Before being paid in private, you will be asked to answer a short questionnaire about the experiment and
you will have to handle back the instructions.
Please read now carefully the instructions on your own. If you have questions, raise your hand and you
will be answered privately.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXPERIMENT AND GOOD LUCK!
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